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Interpretation of the Constitutional provisions relating to international law 
  
Michele Olivier
✴
  
  
1. INTRODUCTION  
  
The 1993 Constitution,
1
 for the first time in South African history accorded 
constitutional recognition to international law, thereby bringing an end to the debate 
on the status of international law in South African domestic law. This step was a 
symbolic break from the apartheid legal system, which was closely associated with 
the violation of international law and indicated to the international community that 
South Africa was willing to abide by internationally accepted rules. More important, 
however, for South African lawyers are the fundamental changes the constitutional 
regulation of international law introduced into South African law.  
  
The 1993 Constitution dealt with the conclusion of international agreements 
(sections 82(1)(i) and 231(2)), the status of international law in South African law 
(section 231(3) and (4)) and the role of international law in interpreting the chapter 
on fundamental rights (section 35(1)). These provisions were substantially taken 
over by the 1996 Constitution. The provisions relating to the entry into international 
agreements and the status thereof in terms of South African law are once again dealt 
with under section 231. The provisions on customary international law are dealt with 
separately under section 232. Section 233 deals with the role of international law in 
the interpretation of legislation, whilst section 39, the equivalent of section 35 of the 
1993 Constitution, provides for international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
✴   This paper is based on a doctoral thesis by M E Olivier entitled International law in South African municipal  
      law: human rights procedure, policy and practice (2002) UNISA.  
1    The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993.  
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 Not much has yet been written as far as analysis of the above sections are 
concerned. Presently, the primary sources pertaining to procedural aspects are the 
Manual on Executive Acts, issued by the Office of the President, and practice arising 
from the application of the Manual by the State Law Advisers of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. Court decisions and academic writings play a very important role in 
decoding the relevant international law terminology used by the Constitution as well 
as the determination of the status various sources of international law enjoy in terms 
of South African law.  
 
This paper will look at three leading court cases bearing on the constitutional status 
of international law:   
• S v Makwanyane on the interpretation of section 35 of the 1993 Constitution 
pertaining to the role of international human rights law in the interpretation of 
the Bill of Rights.   
• The judgments by the Cape High Court and the Constitutional Court in Harksen v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others on the interpretation of the 
term ‘international agreement’ as provided for by section 231 by both the 1993 
and 1996 Constitutions.  
 
   
2 INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A TOOL OF INTERPRETATION: S V 
MAKWANYANE AND ANOTHER 
2
  
  
In S v Makwanyane and Another, the Constitutional Court dealt with the 
constitutionality of the death penalty.  The 1993 Constitution did not express itself 
on the matter of capital punishment.  It was decided during the negotiating process 
neither to exclude nor to sanction the death penalty, but to leave it to the 
Constitutional Court to decide whether the death penalty is consistent with Chapter 3 
of the Constitution.
3
  The matter was brought to the Constitutional Court for decision 
in S v Makwanyane and Another on behalf of two accused sentenced to death on 
counts of murder. It was contended on behalf of the accused that the imposition of 
the death penalty for murder was a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment that 
should be declared unconstitutional. Chaskalson P made extensive and creative use 
of international law in his judgment.  
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Chaskalson P resorted to international law in interpreting the Constitution. It was 
argued that documents used during the negotiating process (specifically those 
relating to the position of the death penalty), formed part of the context within which 
the Constitution should be interpreted.
4
 He considered circumstances existing at the 
time the Constitution was adopted, in interpreting the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution. Chaskalson found authority permitting the use of such evidence in 
international law. He referred to the European Court of Human Rights and the United 
Nations Committee on Human Rights whose deliberations are informed by traveaux 
preparatoires as described by article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.
5
 Chaskalson referred to other countries where the constitution is the 
supreme law such as Germany, Canada, the United States and India, where courts 
may have regard to circumstances prevailing during the drafting of the Constitution.
6
 
He also makes reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
may assist the court in interpretation of the Constitution.
7
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  S v Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC).  
3  S v Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 25.  
4  S v Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 12-17.  
5  S v Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 16 and 17. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides under 
the heading Supplementary means of interpretation: “Recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order 
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31 [general rule of interpretation], or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31; (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous 
or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”  
6  S v Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 16.  
7  S v Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) 697 note 23.   
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The second point of relevance from an international law perspective relates to the 
interpretation of section 35(1) of chapter 3 of the 1993 Constitution, which read as 
follows:  
  
In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the values 
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and 
shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the 
protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to 
comparable foreign case law. (own emphasis)  
  
Chaskalson underlined the distinction made by section 35 (1) between decisions of 
courts of foreign countries, the consideration of which is discretionary,
8
 and those 
expressions of international law which courts are obliged to consider.
9
 He pointed 
out that the court is not bound to follow either international law or comparable foreign 
case law.
10
 He stressed that the court must construe the South African Constitution 
and not an international instrument or the constitution of some foreign country and 
that this can only be done with due regard to South African realities.
11
 International 
agreements and international customary law provide a framework within which 
chapter 3 can be evaluated and understood. He proceeded to single out decisions of 
tribunals dealing with comparable instruments such as the United Nations 
Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and 
the European Court of Human Rights, and in appropriate cases, reports of 
specialised agencies such as the international Labour Organisation which may 
provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of particular provisions of Chapter 
3.
12
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8  N Botha “International law in the Constitutional Court” (1995) 20 SAYIL at 224 points out that under section 
35 courts must consider only the international human rights law and not international law in general.  He 
argues the decisions of foreign courts on matters of international human rights law can also be considered 
as peremptory but only in so far as they indirectly reflect the position under international law.  
9  S v Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 34.  
10  S v Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 39 .  
11  S v Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 39.  
12  S v Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 35.  
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Chaskalson interprets the term public international law as follows:  
  
In the context of section 35(1), public international law would include non-binding as 
well as binding law. They may both be used under the section as tools of 
interpretation.
13
   
  
Chaskalson describes binding law as international law binding on South Africa in 
terms of the requirements set out by section 231 of the Constitution. Such law would 
be rules of customary international law binding on South Africa and international 
agreements to which South Africa is a party. Non-binding international law would 
therefore refer to law not binding on South Africa in terms of section 231. 
Unfortunately Chaskalson limits such non-binding law to the traditional sources of 
international law as listed by section 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. As authority Chaskalson refers to Dugard’s suggestion “that section 35 
requires regard to be had to ‘all the sources of international law recognised by article 
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice …’.”
14
 In terms of this view 
non-binding sources would refer to binding international law, which do not bind South 
Africa namely international agreements to which South Africa is not a party, 
customary international law not binding on South Africa and the sources mentioned 
in article 38(c) and (d). The sources mentioned under article 38(c) and (d) are 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations, judicial decisions and 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.
15
 Such interpretation excludes 
sources of international law falling outside the scope of article 38 such as soft law. 
Human rights resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly such as 
non-customary provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would be 
one very important example of an instrument of soft law, which would be excluded in 
terms of this interpretation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
13  S v Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 35.  
14 S v Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) 686 note 46.  
15   T Maluwa “The incorporation of international law and its interpretational role in municipal legal systems in  
Africa: an exploratory survey” (1998) 23 SAYIL at 59 argues to the contrary that there is no doubt that the 
scope of international law envisaged by Chaskalson P encompasses not only the ‘hard’ law of customary 
rules, treaty provisions and judicial decisions, but also ‘soft’ law contained in resolutions, declarations and 
guidelines drawn up by the appropriate international bodies, and also international law not binding on South 
Africa.  
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Chaskalson concluded that “capital punishment is not prohibited by international law, 
and this is a factor that has to be taken into account in deciding whether it is cruel, 
inhuman or degrading within the meaning of section 11(2)”.
16
   
  
Chaskalson’s view that those international agreements binding on South Africa after 
ratification or accession in terms of article 231 provide only a framework for the 
interpretation of Chapter 3 under section 35, stands to  be critisised. This is in 
contrast with the intention of the drafters that international agreements to which 
South Africa is a party and binding custom, should form part of the law of the land in 
so far as they are not in conflict with the Constitution. Surely it is necessary to 
differentiate on a theoretical basis between binding and non-binding international law 
for purposes of the interpretation of Chapter 3. Binding law is binding and 
non-binding is not binding but may be used for other purposes, such as an 
interpretative aid. It is suggested that section 35 should only refer to non-binding 
international law and that binding international law should be treated in terms of the 
provisions of section 231.   
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16  Section of the Constitution prohibiting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.. S v 
Makwanyane1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) par 36.  
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3  INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT BY    
SOUTH AFRICAN COURTS: THE HARKSEN CASES  
 
Where the South African Constitution of 1983 referred to “international agreements, 
treaties and conventions”
17
 both the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions speak only of an 
“international agreement” in their respective section 231s. Although neither of the 
Constitutions defines the term “international agreement”, it was understood that the 
definition based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties would be followed 
which describes an international agreement as a written agreement between states 
governed by international law.
18
   
  
Section 231 reads as follows:  
  
1. The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of 
the national executive.  
 
An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by 
resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, 
unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection  
An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an 
agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the 
national executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly 
and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the 
Council within a reasonable time. South African courts first entered the debate on 
clarifying the meaning of the term “international agreement” and the classification of 
different kinds of agreements for purposes of section 231 in the Harksen cases.
19
 
The judgment of the Cape High Court
20
 followed by a Constitutional Court decision
21
 
endorse the practical relevance of academic discourse on the meaning of the term 
“international agreement”. The resulting constitutional interpretation provides 
government law advisers with much needed guidance in applying section 231.
22
  
17   See section 8(3)(e) of Act 110 of 1983.  
18   M E Olivier “The status of international law in South African municipal law: section 231 of the 1993  
 Constitution” (1993/94) 19 SAYIL 5.  
19   For a dicussion see N Botha “Lessons from Harksen:Constitutionality of extradition” (2000)  XXXIII CILSA 
 274 and N Botha “International law in South African courts” (1999)  24 SAYIL 330.  
20   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 1 SA 1185 (CPD).  
21   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 2 SA 825 (CC).  
22   See JB Schneeberger “A labyrinth of tautology: The meaning of the term “international agreement”  and its  
significance for South African law  and treaty making practice”  (2001)  LLM Dissertation University of    
Pretoria  28. 
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The facts leading to the court applications were as follows: Harksen, a German 
citizen present in South Africa, was sought by the Federal Republic of Germany to 
face charges of fraud. The South African government received a request for 
Harksen’s extradition from Germany in March 1994. Both the South African and 
German governments denied the existence of an extradition treaty between them. 
Section 3(2) of the South African Extradition Act
23
 provides for extradition between 
South Africa and foreign countries where there is no extradition agreement:  
  
Any person accused or convicted of an extraditable offence committed within the 
jurisdiction of a foreign State which is not a party to an extradition agreement shall 
be liable to be surrendered to such foreign State, if the President has in writing 
consented to his or her being surrendered.  
  
A series of diplomatic notes dealing with Harksen’s extradition were exchanged by 
the German government and the South African government through the Department 
of Foreign Affairs. The president subsequently granted his consent to extradite 
Harksen on the basis of section 3(2) of the Extradition Act.  
  
2 CAPE HIGH COURT APPLICATION  
 
 Harksen brought an application before the Cape High Court consisting of a 
constitutional application and a review application. The review application dealing 
with irregularities in the extradition inquiry will not be considered here. Of importance 
for present purposes is the constitutional application.   
  
It was argued on behalf of Harksen that the President’s consent in terms of section 
3(2) of the Extradition Act to the German request for extradition constituted an 
international agreement. In fact “every extradition is regarded per se as an 
international agreement between the State requesting extradition and the state 
acceding to that request”.
24
 Such bilateral agreement contravenes the provisions of 
section 231 of the Constitution which requires some form of parliamentary 
involvement and is therefore invalid
25
. Harksen inter alia relied on a supporting 
affidavit of Professor MG Erasmus where he stated that the “inter-State transaction” 
relating to Harksen’s extradition indeed established a bilateral international 
agreement reflected in the exchange of notes. This agreement created binding rights 
and obligations for both states. To deny this would demonstrate an 
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“executive-mindedness that cannot be reconciled with South Africa’s new 
constitutional dispensation”.
26
 It was suggested on behalf of Harksen that the Vienna 
Convention, specifically the definition of a treaty, forms part of South African law 
through section 232 of the Constitution. It was, however, submitted that the term 
“international agreement” is wider than the term “treaty” and would include ad hoc 
agreements of an informal nature. The relevance of this argument was not 
substantiated by indicating into which of the above categories the present series of 
diplomatic notes would fall. All international agreements must be dealt with under 
section 231(2) requiring parliamentary approval, alternatively under section 231(3) 
requiring tabling in parliament within a reasonable time. To become part of South 
African law it would have to be enacted in national legislation. Section 3(2) of the 
Extradition Act, which makes no provision for either parliamentary approval or 
tabling, would therefore be unconstitutional.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23   Extradition Act 67 of 1962.  
24   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 1 SA 1185 (CPD) par 29.  
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The respondents addressed two issues in their arguments namely the nature of 
extradition and the applicability of section 231. Regarding the first, it was suggested 
that in the absence of an extradition treaty, extradition is essentially an act of state 
based on comity between nations or the principle of reciprocity. In this regard 
reference was made to Botha’s article “The basis of extradition: The South African 
perspective”
27
 where he observes that a formalised strain of comity is reflected 
through section 3(2) of the Extradition Act. An ad hoc request for extradition and 
consent thereto by the President therefore does not amount to an international 
agreement with a status similar to that of a treaty.
28
 Extradition in the absence of a 
treaty is a voluntary act, based on comity and determined by municipal law. As far as 
the second issue was concerned, it was argued that since there was no intention on 
the part of either South Africa or Germany to create an international agreement with 
enforceable rights and duties, the present arrangement could be regarded as an 
informal or ad hoc agreement or arrangement. Such instruments are legally 
non-binding and fall outside the scope of section 231.
29
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 1 SA 1185 (CPD) par 23-34.  
26   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 1 SA 1185 (CPD) par 25 H at 1194.  
27   N Botha “The basis of extradition: the South African perspective” (1991/92) 17 SAYIL 17.  
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In delivering judgment, van Zyl J addressed the question whether the consent of the 
President under section 3(2) of the Extradition Act amounts to an international 
agreement for purposes of section 231 of the Constitution. It is heartening to find that 
the court did not shy away from an in-depth investigation of an international law 
issue. Van Zyl makes use of a wide spectrum of authority ranging from Roman law 
writers, internationally renowned experts on international law, to government officials 
to explain the meaning of an international agreement. The requirement lying at the 
heart of a binding international agreement is the intention of the parties to create 
reciprocal rights and obligations. The court stated that ” it is this very intention and 
consent that distinguishes treaties from informal or ad hoc arrangements or 
agreements.”
30
 Van Zyl proceeded to quote extensively from Baxter on the 
difference between “hard” and “soft” law.
31
 The above authority led the court to 
conclude that since the intention to create reciprocal rights and obligations was 
clearly absent in the present case, section 231 did not come into play.  
  
Schneeberger comments on the court’s decision from the perspective of the 
office of the SLA. As far as exchanges of notes are concerned, she alludes 
to the practice that the clear intention to create an international agreement 
should explicitly be reflected in both the note as well as the replying note. 
She remarks that: In addition to being used as a vehicle for the conclusion of 
international agreements diplomatic notes are also the bread and butter of 
diplomatic relations and are used on a daily basis as the standard method of 
diplomatic communication, Diplomatic notes would certainly make up a significant 
portion of what Baxter terms ‘the vast sub-structure of inter-governmental paper’ 
and if each note dealing with any matter of substance were to be considered an 
international agreement then it would certainly create administrative chaos … In this 
sense it is a great relief that the court rejected Harksen’s argument.
32
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 1 SA 1185 (CPD) par 38.  
29   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 1 SA 1185 (CPD) par 42.  
30   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 1 SA 1185 (CPD) par 52.  
31   RR Baxter “International law in her infinite variety (1980) 29 ICLQ  at 556.  
32   Schneeberger (2001) 33.  
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 The judgment can be commended for the measure of judicial clarity it provides on 
the meaning of the term ”international agreement” in section 231. By excluding 
extradition under section 3(2) of the Extradition Act from the scope of section 231, 
the court indirectly supported the understanding that the term “international 
agreements” as used by section 231 applies only to legally binding agreements 
creating enforceable rights and duties.
33
 By following this line of argument the court 
further recognised the separate and thriving species of informal agreements. 
Although they fall outside the scope of the Constitution and are not legally binding 
they may still bear significant legal relevance as was illustrated in the present case.  
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3  THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT APPLICATION  
 
  
The above clearly did not accord with Harksen’s understanding of matters as he 
proceeded to approach the Constitutional Court. Harksen maintained that 
presidential consent under section 3(2) constituted an international agreement, 
which would be invalid for non-compliance with section 231.  
  
As in the case of the Cape High Court decision, the Constitutional Court considered 
the legal effect of the presidential consent under section 231. In a judgment 
delivered by Goldstone, the court stated that although presidential consent under 
section 3(2) may eventually have international resonance, the Extradition Act 
governs applications for extradition on the domestic plane only.
34
 It neither initiates 
nor concludes extradition.
35
 In the light of the above the court supported the High 
Court decision and dismissed the submission regarding the unconstitutionality of 
section 3(2). Even if section 231 were to govern acts under section 3(2), failure to 
expressly incorporate the terms of section 231 would not render section 3(2) 
unconstitutional. All legislation is automatically read subject to the Constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33   See ME Olivier “Informal international agreements under the 1996 Constitution” (1997)  22 SAYIL at 65.  
34   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 2 SA 825 (CC) par 14.  
35   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 2 SA 825 (CC) par 15.  
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The court further disposes of the applicant’s remaining submissions that presidential 
consent would be invalid for want of compliance with the provisions of section 231. 
The court accepted, with reference to Oppenheim’s International Law
36
 that:   
  
Although the judicial determination of the existence of an international agreement 
may require the consideration of a number of complex issues, the decisive factor is 
said to be whether ‘the instrument is intended to create international legal rights and 
obligations between the parties’.  
  
The court, however, proceeded to follow a different line of reasoning than that of the 
Cape High Court. The latter regarded the intention of parties to create binding rights 
and obligations as the test for binding international agreements, however 
agreements between international role players not intended to create such rights and 
obligations were accepted as informal agreements, falling outside the scope of the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court, however, maintained that there were no 
agreements at all in the present case, neither formal nor informal.
37
 The court held 
that the decision to extradite in terms of section 3(2) was never more than a 
domestic act, which was never transformed into an agreement by way of the 
exchange of diplomatic notes:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
36   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 2 SA 825 (CC) par 21.  
37   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 2 SA 825 (CC) par 21.  
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In this case there is no evidence to suggest that any formal response was conveyed 
on behalf of South Africa to the FRG. It is thus not necessary to consider whether, if 
there had been such a response, an international agreement would thereby have 
been concluded.
38
  
  
The court in effect finds that there was never any meeting of minds between the two 
states to extradite Harksen. The court does not address the scenario where South 
Africa did in fact send a diplomatic note to Germany expressing its willingness to 
adhere to Germany’s request for extradition. It is unfortunate that the court did not 
express a view on the legal nature of such an agreement. In terms of this line of 
argument, the court pays no regard to the phenomenon of informal agreements but 
does not denounce their existence. The aspects of the judgment of the Cape High 
Court regarding informal agreements in general therefore stand.  
  
The significance of the Constitutional Court judgment can be summarised as follows:  
  
The first significant consequence of the Constitutional Court decision is its support 
for the view of the Cape High Court that international agreements for purposes of 
section 231 are agreements where the parties intend to create mutually enforceable 
rights and obligations. The meaning of the term “international agreement” as used by 
section 231 of the Constitution should be given a narrow interpretation to coincide 
with the term “treaty” as it is used in the Vienna Convention. In other words, the 
category of international agreements envisaged by the Constitution, refers only to 
legally binding agreements or treaties. Since all international agreements cannot be 
regarded as binding, it is implicit from the judgment that non-binding agreements 
between states fall outside the scope of section 231. Regrettably, the court chose 
not to comment on this distinction identified by the Cape High Court.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
38   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 2 SA 825 (CC) par 23.  
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The court’s view that the reason why the decision by the President in favour of 
extradition under section 3(2) of the Extradition Act is not an international agreement, 
is flawed. This decision is firstly and correctly based on the domestic nature thereof. 
The court however departs from this line of thinking when it argues that the facts did 
not indicate that the correspondence between South Africa and Germany was ever 
completed to formalise the matter of Harksen’s extradition. The potential 
contradiction of the first argument lies in the fact that the court recognises the 
possibility that if there had been such a response, an international agreement would 
thereby have been concluded.
39
   
  
This leads to the inevitable question as to what the legal situation would be when 
Germany is eventually informed of the decision to extradite Harksen. If such 
diplomatic correspondence (Germany’s request for extradition and South Africa’s 
communication of its decision to extradite) leads to an international agreement, the 
question remains whether it would be an international agreement for purposes of 
section 231. (The answer cannot be anything but affirmative if the existence of 
informal international agreements is not recognised.) If this is indeed the case, the 
decision by the President under section 3(2) of the Extradition Act would indeed 
require additional approval under section 231(2) or (3). In such a case the argument 
as to the domestic nature of decisions under section 3(2) goes up in smoke.  
  
The Harksen case confronted the court with arguments where it had to search for 
answers in international law. Fortunately, and surprisingly, the court did not attempt 
to deal with this matter in terms of foreign domestic case law. The court was forced 
to consider the Vienna Convention in response to the applicant’s arguments. 
Although the court was wary to accept the customary status of the Convention as a 
whole, it had to consult international authority such as Oppenheim and Brownlie to 
come to this decision.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39   Harksen v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 2 SA 825 (CC) par 23 at 835.  
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4 CONCLUSION  
 
  
International law, a legal system marginalized and distorted by apartheid, was 
restored to its rightful status as part of South African law by the 1993 and 1996 
South African Constitutions. The constitutional regulation of the status of 
international law, however, introduced new concepts into South African law. Courts, 
governmental law advisers and academics are looked at to provide guidance in the 
interpretation of international law terminology, which have now become part of South 
African constitutional law. The Makwanyane and Harksen cases provide much 
needed guidance in this regard. In clarifying the content of the terms ”public 
international law” in Makwanyane and “international agreement” in the Harksen 
cases the courts had to resort to primary sources of international law. Despite their 
divergent facts and legal questions, the courts in all three cases had to assess the 
binding nature of international law, be it as a source of international law or as 
legitimate species of international agreement. This requires a sound knowledge of 
international law. Despite the possible errors and omissions in the courts’ judgments, 
these cases focussed the debate on the increasing relevance of international law in 
matters before domestic courts.    
  
  
